Batterman ([2010]) raises a number of concerns for the inferential conception of the applicability of mathematics advocated by Bueno and Colyvan ([2011] ). Here, we distinguish the various concerns, and indicate how they can be assuaged by paying attention to the nature of the mappings involved and emphasizing the significance of interpretation in this context. We also indicate how this conception can accommodate the examples that Batterman draws upon in his critique. Our conclusion is that 'asymptotic reasoning' can be straightforwardly accommodated within the inferential conception.
Introduction
Robert Batterman has recently argued that contemporary accounts of the role of mathematics in physical explanations are deficient in not appropriately accommodating certain forms of idealization that he claims to be crucial for explicating a range of significant physical behaviour (Batterman [2010] ).
Our aim here is to argue that, contrary to Batterman's assertion, the inferential account of Bueno and Colyvan ([2011] ), suitably explicated in terms of partial structures and attendant notions, can in fact accommodate these idealizations in a perfectly straightforward manner.
2 However, we shall raise concerns as to the sense in which explanation is involved in the case considered. After recalling the details of our account, we show that Batterman's claims either rely on a misconception of this view, or can be straightforwardly accommodated by it.
2 Immersion, Inference, and Partial Structures
The core claim of our view is that it is by embedding certain features of the empirical world into a mathematical structure that it becomes possible to obtain inferences that would otherwise be extraordinarily hard (if not impossible) to obtain. Of course, applied mathematics may have other roles (Bueno and Colyvan [2011] ), which range from unifying disparate scientific theories through helping to make novel predictions (from suitably interpreted mathematical structures) to providing explanations of empirical phenomena (again from certain interpretations of the mathematical formalism), an example of which we shall be exploring here. However, all of these roles ultimately depend on the ability to establish inferential relations between empirical phenomena and mathematical structures, or among mathematical structures themselves. For example, when disparate scientific theories are unified, one establishes inferential relations between such theories, showing, for example, how one can derive the results of one of the theories from the other. Similarly, in the case of novel predictions, by invoking suitable empirical interpretations of mathematical theories, scientists can draw inferences about the empirical world that the original scientific theory wasn't constructed to make. Finally, in the case of mathematical explanations, inferences from (suitable interpretations of) the mathematical formalism to the empirical world are established, and in terms of these inferences, the explanations are formulated.
To accommodate this important inferential role, it's obviously crucial to establish certain mappings in the form of partial isomorphisms (or partial homomorphisms) between the appropriate theoretical and mathematical version of the inferential conception that we favour (in terms of partial structures), we think that such explanations require a suitable physical interpretation of the mathematics: the mathematics alone cannot do any of the explanatory work. 2 In previous work (see Batterman [2000] ), Batterman has focussed on the apparent gain in understanding that can be achieved by such idealizations. Although there has been some discussion of the relationship between explanation and understanding in the literature, in this article we shall primarily focus on the former, given the context in which Batterman raises his criticisms of Bueno and Colyvan's approach. structures, with further partial morphisms holding between the former and structures lower down in the hierarchy, all the way down to the empirical structures representing the appearances, at the bottom. The details have been given in several places but we repeat them here for convenience. One of the main motivations for introducing this account comes from the need to supply a formal framework in which the openness and incompleteness of information dealt with in scientific practice can be accommodated. This is accomplished by extending the usual notion of structure, and advancing the notion of a partial structure, in order to model the partialness of information we have about a certain domain (see da Costa and French [2003] ).
The first step, which paves the way to introduce partial structures, is to formulate an appropriate notion of partial relation. When investigating a certain domain of knowledge Á (say, the physics of particles), we formulate a conceptual framework that helps us in systematizing the information we obtain about Á. This domain is represented by a set D of objects (which includes real objects, such as configurations in a Wilson chamber and spectral lines, and ideal objects, such as quarks). D is studied by the examination of the relations holding among its elements. However, it often happens that, given a relation R defined over D, we do not know whether R relates all of the objects of D (or n-tuples thereof). This is part and parcel of the 'incompleteness' of our information about Á, and is formally accommodated by the concept of partial relation.
The latter can be characterized as follows. Let D be a non-empty set. An n-place partial relation R over D is a triple hR 1 ,R 2 ,R 3 i, where R 1 , R 2 , and R 3 are mutually disjoint sets, with R 1 [R 2 [R 3 ¼ D n , and such that: R 1 is the set of n-tuples that (we know that) belong to R, R 2 is the set of n-tuples that (we know that) do not belong to R, and R 3 is the set of n-tuples for which it is not known whether they belong or not to R. (Note that if R 3 is empty, R is a usual n-place relation that can be identified with R 1 .) A partial structure A is then an ordered pair hD,R i i i2I , where D is a non-empty set, and (R i ) i2I is a family of partial relations defined over D.
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With these concepts in hand, we can now define the notions of partial isomorphism and partial homomorphism that will be crucial for our analysis. Consider the question: what is the relationship between the various partial structures articulated in a given domain? Since we are dealing with partial structures, a second level of partiality emerges: typically, we can only establish partial relationships between the (partial) structures at our disposal. This means that the usual requirement of introducing an isomorphism between theoretical and empirical structures can hardly be met. Relationships weaker than full isomorphism, full homomorphism etc. have to be introduced, otherwise scientific practice-where partiality of information appears to be ubiquitous-cannot be properly accommodated (for details, see Bueno [1997] ; French [1997] ; French and Ladyman [1997] ).
Here is a way of characterizing, in terms of the partial structures approach, appropriate notions of partial isomorphism and partial homomorphism (Bueno [1997] ; Bueno et al. [2002] 
. So, when R 3 and R 0 3 are empty (that is, when we are considering total structures), we have the standard notion of isomorphism.
Moreover, we say that a partial function f:
. Again, if R 3 and R 0 3 are empty, we obtain the standard notion of homomorphism as a particular case.
Using these notions, we can provide a framework for accommodating the application of mathematics to theory construction in science. The main idea is that mathematics is applied by bringing structure from a mathematical domain (say, functional analysis) into a physical, but mathematized, domain (such as quantum mechanics). What we have, thus, is a structural perspective, which involves the establishment of relations between structures in different domains. Crucially, we typically have surplus structure at the mathematical level, 5 so only some structure is brought from mathematics to physics; in particular, those relations which help us to find counterparts, at the empirical domain, of relations that hold at the mathematical domain. In this way, by 'transferring structure' from a mathematical to a physical domain, empirical problems can be better represented and tackled. It is straightforward to accommodate this situation using partial structures. The partial homomorphism represents the situation in which only some structure is brought from mathematics to physics (via the R 1 -and R 2 -components, which represent our current information about the relevant domain), although 'more structure' could be found at the mathematical domain (via the R 3 -component, which is left open). Moreover, given the partiality of information, just part of the mathematical structures is preserved, namely that part about which we have enough information to match the empirical domain.
These formal details can then be deployed to underpin the following three-stage scheme, which is called the inferential conception of the application of mathematics (Bueno and Colyvan [2011] ): 6 Step 1: a mapping is established from the physical situation to a convenient mathematical structure. This step is called immersion. The point of immersion is to relate the relevant aspects of the physical situation with the appropriate mathematical context. The former can be taken very broadly, and includes the whole spectrum of contexts to which mathematics is applied. Although the choice of mapping is a contextual matter, and largely dependent on the particular details of the application, typically such mappings will be partial, due to the presence, not least, of idealizations in the physical set up. These can then be straightforwardly accommodated, and the partial mappings represented, via the framework of partial isomorphisms and partial homomorphisms.
Step 2: consequences are drawn from the mathematical formalism, using the mathematical structure obtained in the immersion step. This is the derivation step. This is, of course, a key point of the application process, where consequences from the mathematical formalism are generated.
Step 3: the mathematical consequences that were obtained in the derivation step are interpreted in terms of the initial physical situation. This is the interpretation step. To establish an interpretation, a mapping from the mathematical structure to that initial physical set up is needed. This need not be simply the inverse of the mapping used in the immersion step. In some contexts, we may have a different mapping from the one that was used in the latter. As long as the mappings in question are defined for suitable domains, no problems need emerge.
Thus, this account precisely emphasizes, as Batterman puts it, that 'underlying both the purely representative aspects of (the mixed statements of) applied mathematics, and the explanatory aspects, is the idea that the proper understanding of applied mathematics involves some sort of mapping between mathematical structures and the physical situation under investigation' ([2010] , p. 9). For us, the mapping is best characterized in terms of partial isomorphisms and homomorphisms holding between partial structures (although some other partial mappings can also be used).
We are now in a position to tackle the supposed deficiencies that Batterman ([2010] ) takes to be characteristic of this kind of account.
Idealization and Surplus Structure
One of the much-extolled virtues of the partial structures account is that it can easily accommodate idealizations in science (see French and Ladyman [1998] ; da Costa and French [2003] ). Batterman asks an important question in this regard: How can idealizations play an explanatory role? As he says, part of the answer is that 'we can tell a story about how they ultimately can be removed by paying more attention to details that are ignored or overlooked by more idealized models' ([2010] , p. 15). However, in the cases he presents, no such story can be told, or so it would seem. Thus, it is a good thing that it is no part of either the inferential account in particular or the partial structures approach in general that a less idealized model will necessarily be more explanatory than the given more idealized one.
7 This can be seen from reflection on the general nature of the approach. If one were to insist that explanatory strength varies inversely with the degree of idealization (however strength and degree, respectively, are to be determined), one would have to supply some account of that relationship. However, such an account would have to draw on further resources that go beyond the purview of the inferential conception. In fact, the inferential conception is neutral on the particular relation between explanatory strength and idealization. In some cases, more idealized models are more explanatory; in other instances, the reverse is the case.
Having said that, we shall argue that there are difficulties in understanding the kinds of models put forward by Batterman as explanatory at all. As will become clear, the central issue is not whether such models are idealized, but whether they are explanatory, given the role that mathematical devices play in such models.
Batterman himself maintains that the cases he presents are at odds with structuralist, mapping accounts because, first of all, 'such idealizations trade on the fact that in many instances "overly simple" model equations can better explain the most salient features of a phenomenon than can a more detailed less idealized model' ([2010] , p. 17), and secondly, they involve limits that are singular, in the sense that the relevant object ceases to be well defined (ibid.). Now, with regard to the first point, the notion of a better explanation here presumably has to do with bringing out the relevant features of interest and depending on what those features are, adding further details in an effort to de-idealize the account may well obscure what is going on and lead to a less good explanation. There appears to be nothing here that would be at odds with the framework we advocate. The second point has to do with accommodating singularities; again, we maintain that this is not a problem, and we shall show why this is so in the context of Batterman's example, below.
7 Mark Colyvan emphasized this point in a personal communication to Batterman (see Batterman [2010] , p. 16).
Batterman goes on to claim that limiting operations of the kind involved in the explanations he is concerned with 'are simply not the sorts of gizmos which figure in a (partial) representation, the explication of which is the aim of the various mapping accounts' ([2010] , p. 19). The criticism here appears to depend upon a limited understanding of the resources available to the partial structures approach. Certainly, the kinds of structures we deploy are set-theoretical, and insofar as a limiting mathematical operation is well defined, it can be characterized set-theoretically and hence represented within our framework.
Moreover In response, even if we grant that there are no possible physical structures corresponding to the relevant divergences, it is still possible to make room for the latter within our framework. One of the features of the account we advocate is that it can accommodate the role of surplus mathematical structure, whereby a given physical structure can be related via partial homomorphisms (or some other partial morphism) to a suitable mathematical structure, which in turn is related to further mathematical structure, some of which can then in turn be interpreted physically (see Bueno [1997] ; Bueno et al. [2002] ; and Bueno and Colyvan [2011] ). 8 We can represent such a surplus structure within the inferential conception by straightforward iteration: the initial mathematical model (Model 1) that is used to represent the original empirical set up is itself immersed into another model (Model 2), which gives us the surplus structure, and the results are then interpreted back into Model 1, which only 8 In the example of the renormalization group to be discussed below, one takes the thermodynamic limit as the number of particles tends to infinity. In the purely mathematical sense, this is just a limit as n approaches infinity and can, of course, be represented set-theoretically. However, Batterman's further point is that the limit corresponds to an idealization that plays a significant explanatory role ([2010] , p. 7). Showing how one can represent such idealization in terms of surplus structure, without the mathematics alone playing an explanatory role, is one of the goals of this article.
then is interpreted into the physical set up. The diagram above ( Figure 1 ) illustrates the situation. Even if there is no possible physical structure analogous to the surplus structure (where asymptotic reasoning takes place), it is perfectly possible for the intermediary structures-that is, Model 1 in Figure 1 -to have a suitable physical interpretation. These intermediary structures ultimately link the surplus structure to the empirical set up. In this way, as will become clear below, the formal framework we advance has suitable resources to accommodate Batterman's cases.
In other words, Batterman's challenge can be met: the kinds of example he presents can be accommodated as surplus structure, appropriately related to mathematical structures that are physically interpreted.
9 Consider, for example, the now classic case of the explanation of certain features of rainbows, highlighted by Batterman. 10 A rainbow is a caustic surface that is the boundary between regions of zero and non-zero light intensity and thus it emerges as a singularity from geometrical optics (a caustic surface being the envelope of a family of light rays). However, ray optics cannot explain the appearance of supernumerary bows and interference effects in general (for an accessible introduction, see Berry and Howls [1993] ). Here, the work of Berry Figure 1 . The iterated inferential conception of applied mathematics. 9 We shall return to the issue of providing a physical interpretation below, when we consider Belot's contribution (Belot [2005] ). 10 We would like to thank one of the referees for encouraging us to consider this example. and others has proved crucial in characterizing the invariant features of these interference phenomena that underlie the universality that is the focus of Batterman's analysis. The universality is understood via catastrophe theory, which captures the structural stability involved, and the crucial relationship, from our point of view, is the isomorphism that holds between the theory of stable caustics and the relevant parts of catastrophe theory (Berry and Upstill [1980] ). It is this that underpins the embedding of the former into the latter in a way that fits nicely with the inferential approach we advocate. Indeed, 'the stable caustics have the same structure as the catastrophes' (ibid., p. 260).
Here the rays are represented by a multi-valued action function whose constant action surfaces are the wavefronts of geometrical optics and whose branches meet on a caustic. This function, including its multi-valued nature, is represented in catastrophe theory by embedding it in a single-valued function with extra variables (Berry and Upstill [1980] , p. 264). In the language of catastrophe theory, as Berry and Upstill say, this latter function is a generating function in terms of which a 'gradient map' can be defined from the spatial position of the point of observation to the relevant state variables. They give the analogy with the height of a landscape above a plane where the coordinates of the extrema (such as hilltops and saddles) correspond to the rays and the heights give the actions. As the observation point changes so do the extrema and when two or more extrema coalesce the gradient map is singular. Since rays coalesce on caustics, they conclude that caustics correspond to singularities of gradient maps (ibid., p. 267).
Thus, what we have is the empirical phenomenon, namely rainbows, first modelled in terms of ray optics. This corresponds to our immersion step 1. We then have an embedding within catastrophe theory, corresponding to immersion step 2, where the multi-valued function is embedded in a single-valued function with extra variables. In this context, there is considerable surplus structure (e.g. there are numerous ways in which the branches of the multi-valued action function can be represented as the extreme values of the single-valued function). Interpretation 2 involves identifying the caustic as a singularity of the gradient map and Interpretation 1 takes us back to geometrical optics. What is important is that the surplus structure of catastrophe theory can then be drawn upon to investigate the structural stability of these singularities (ibid., pp. 267ff). These investigations are then brought back over the structural relationship, as it were, to the model and its interpretation in terms of the phenomena concerned.
We can think of this situation as another example in which one mathematical structure (wave optics) is related to another (ray optics), via catastrophe theory, and understanding is achieved via this relationship, just as the theory of functions of a real variable is illuminated via its relation to the complex plane (Redhead [2004] , p. 529). From this perspective, as we have indicated, catastrophe theory represents surplus structure, some of which comes to be physically interpreted so as to provide an account of the above universality. Batterman's point is that this kind of structure, albeit surplus, nevertheless plays an explanatory role. However, as we shall argue in what follows, it remains unclear how that role can be spelled out in Batterman's terms. We will canvas one possible way of doing this, and will argue that it can also be captured within our approach.
Renormalization and the Stability of Mathematical Representations
Batterman's own account of the role of mathematics in physical theorizing hinges on the claim that 'to explain and understand the robustness of patterns and regularities, one sometimes needs to focus on places where those very regularities break down ' ([2010] , p. 20; emphasis in original). It is through the investigation of singularities in mathematical limiting operations that we begin to understand the effectiveness of mathematics in these situations. Furthermore, he maintains, 'it is an approach that is completely orthogonal to structuralist/mapping accounts that take explanations necessarily to involve static representational maps' ([2010] , p. 21). Such accounts are thus deficient in that they miss 'in many cases, what is explanatorily relevant about idealizations; namely, that they often involve processes or limiting operations' ([2010] , p. 10). On the contrary, we believe that Batterman's useful and illuminating examples can in fact be captured by our approach (as indicated above), not least because insofar as his putative explanations involve non-static processes and limiting operations, these can both be accommodated within our framework. Mathematical operations and 'processes' in general are simply functions, transformations, mappings, and so forth, and these can be, and indeed explicitly have been, incorporated into the partial structures framework. Given the set-theoretic context of that framework, functions, transformations, and mappings are just particular kinds of relations, and thus can be immediately represented.
11 It seems to us that there is no other sense of 'dynamical' relationship that would be appropriate here. Hence, it is not the case that mapping-based accounts have focused solely on static relationships, insofar as this can be clearly understood.
11 Our framework inherits all the advantages of the set-theoretic underpinnings of mathematics.
In particular, with regard to the ontology of mathematics, only sets need to be assumed. Other kinds of mathematical objects, such as functions, relations, and numbers, can all be represented in terms of sets. And for those who are inclined towards a nominalist understanding of mathematics, it is still possible to provide a fictionalist reading of the framework as well (see Bueno [2009] ).
Let us move to the details of Batterman's most recent case study. The explanandum is the remarkable coincidence of the behaviour of very different systems near a second-order phase transition, as shown experimentally in terms of their possessing the same critical exponents. This behaviour is described in terms of certain order parameters that scale as a specific power law (Batterman [2010] , p. 7). According to Batterman, the explanandum is thus not a simple regularity per se but rather has to do with the robustness of that regularity. The explanans involves the renormalization group by means of which one can demonstrate that all these systems can be described by the same fixed-point interaction, where the fixed points emerge as invariants of the renormalization group. Broad classes of physical Hamiltonians (corresponding to different systems) then belong to the same universality class.
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So the central idea is to demonstrate, and thus explain, the equivalence of the behaviour of different systems by representing those systems in an abstract Hamiltonian space in which there exist points that are fixed, and hence invariant, under an imposed renormalization group transformation, and towards which the universality class of the given systems will flow. The divergence of the relevant correlation length in the appropriate limit turns out to play a crucial role in this demonstration as it underpins the loss of distinguishability of the systems.
One of the most straightforward examples is Kadanoff's spin block approach. Consider, for example, a lattice of spins (Batterman [2011] ). At a suitable high temperature (above the critical temperature) the spins are randomized, and thus the correlation length is small. As the temperature decreases, the spatial extent of a block of correlated spins increases, with the size of the block offering a measure of the correlation length. At the critical temperature, the correlation length diverges and the material becomes ferromagnetic. Near the critical temperature, the correlation length becomes very large and the relevant governing equations cannot be solved.
The renormalization group is thus introduced as a mathematical technique that, as Batterman ([2011] , p. 1042) says, transforms an intractable problem involving large correlation lengths into a more tractable problem involving reduced lengths, thereby reducing the number of coupled degrees of freedom. Thus, in the spin example, we group the spins into blocks, replace the grouped spins with a so-called 'block spin', transform the relevant lengths so that these new spins sit on the same lattice sites as the old, and then transform the new spin variables so that the new system is as much like the old as possible. In effect this 'blocking' allows us to define the relevant features of the theory at large distances in terms of aggregates of features at shorter distances.
However, it is crucial to keep in mind that this is just a technique, or mathematical device, to overcome a tractability issue.
This sequence can be represented in terms of a series of transformations between Hamiltonians, where these represent the systems and characterize the kinds of interactions between the degrees of freedom (e.g. between the spins) as well as any effects of external fields. Performing the renormalization transformation yields a sequence of Hamiltonians describing systems with the same lattice spacing, but for which the correlation lengths get smaller and smaller (Batterman [2011] , p. 1044).
If we then consider the abstract space whose coordinates are the parameters appearing in the various Hamiltonians of the systems, each point in such a space will correspond to a possible Hamiltonian. In the case of the lattice system, with all parameters except the temperature fixed, as the temperature approaches the critical point, the point representing the system moves about in the space of Hamiltonians; the path that point makes is called 'the physical line'. The space can then be divided up into Hamiltonians of constant correlation length, where a 'critical surface' can be defined that corresponds to infinite correlation length.
Under the renormalization group transformations, every point in the space gets mapped to another, yielding a trajectory issuing from that point. Of specific interest is what happens to points on the critical surface. Points on the critical surface that also lie on the physical line yield trajectories that remain on that surface. Points off the physical line, however, yield trajectories that diverge from the critical surface, intersecting surfaces that correspond to lower correlation lengths (Batterman [2011] , pp. 1044-5). Fixed points are those points in this space which represent a state of the system that is invariant under the renormalization transformation . Finding these fixed points means solving the fixed-point equation: t(H*) ¼ H*.
In other words, one must determine the fixed-point Hamiltonian H* ¼ p*, which is independent of any choice of initial Hamiltonian. Thus, 'universal behavior is explained by reference to properties of certain fixed points. More precisely, it is related to the stability of the fixed points and to how the renormalization group transformation t maps points in the neighbourhood of the fixed points' (Batterman [2011] what sense do such devices contribute to explanations of physical phenomena? Consider the case of the delta function, for example, introduced by Dirac to prove the equivalence of wave and matrix mechanics (see Bueno [2005] ; Bueno and French [unpublished] ). This was explicitly dispensable and treated only as a mathematical device with no suggestion that it played a genuine role in any relevant explanation (not least because it was inconsistent!). This is perhaps a more extreme case, but the point remains: certainly such devices allow for certain simplifications, and they may highlight or make room for the exemplification of certain features of interest. However, although they may play an important role in allowing us to perform the relevant derivations and make the relevant inferences, it should not be immediately assumed that they have an explanatory role, not least because the delta function example indicates how such an assumption might lead us astray. The spin block technique is only one of many such devices deployed in this and related contexts of course; others introduce explicitly fictional spaces of fractional dimensions, or again, explicitly fictional particles with very large masses, or Wilson's 'lattice regularization', where a space-time constructed out of hyper-cubical lattices is constructed. In all such cases, the question remains: what is doing the explanatory work?
The inferential conception on its own does not settle that issue. It all depends on how the relevant mathematics that is used to represent the empirical set up is interpreted. That mathematics can be interpreted in realist terms or not, and it can also be interpreted as playing an explanatory role or not. Platonists about mathematics will take the derivation and the interpretation steps of the inferential conception as involving reference to independently existing mathematical entities (see Colyvan [2001] ), whereas nominalists about mathematics will resist such a move. On their view, mathematical objects are either not referred to at all, since these objects do not exist (see Field [1989] ), or are referred to, but the notion of reference does not require the existence of the corresponding entities (see Azzouni [2004] ).
Furthermore, those who hold that mathematics does play such an explanatory role owe us an account of the nature of explanation involved in the relevant examples from scientific practice. Expressing it as neutrally as possible, any such account must be able to tell us how the mathematics and the relevant physical phenomena are related in a manner that goes beyond the representation of this relation via deduction or other formal devices. One option would be for such an account to say how it is that the relevant physical phenomenon is brought about. One doesn't always have to appeal to causal factors in explicating this bringing about-one might draw on certain structural features, for example. Here are two examples of broadly 'structural' explanations that might seem, at first sight, to be amenable to Batterman's approach, but which, in fact, precisely reveal the concern we have.
The first is that of the explanation of the halting of the gravitational collapse of white dwarf stars (Colyvan [1999] ). Here, the explanans is Pauli's Exclusion Principle that determines how many electrons can occupy the relevant energy state. The core of the explanation consists in the claim that the gravitational attraction on the mass element is balanced by the difference in what is sometimes called the 'Pauli pressure' or 'degeneracy pressure' across the mass shell created by the occupancy of the energy states. Insofar as Pauli's Principle cannot be regarded as a causal law, it has been claimed that this example opens the door to the explanatory role of mathematics. But, of course, Pauli's Principle itself is not mathematical. Indeed, it is usually understood as a consequence of the requirement that the relevant wave-function for an assembly of fermions be asymmetric, which in turn can be interpreted in terms of the action of Permutation Invariance, understood as a fundamental feature of the structure of the world (see French [unpublished] ).
The second example might seem even more conducive to Batterman's analysis, insofar as it involves an explanans that is understood to be fictional, in a sense.
14 This concerns the semi-classical phenomenon of 'wave-function scarring', which, put briefly, involves the amplitude of the wave function becoming highly concentrated along the unstable periodic orbits of a classical chaotic system. The explanation of this phenomenon appeals to classical structures that are known not to exist. According to Bokulich ([2008] ), these fictional structures can be regarded as genuinely explanatory and she gives a model-based account of their explanatory power. The core idea of this account is taken from Morrison ([1999] ), who articulated the explanatory power of models in terms of their exhibition of certain kinds of structural dependencies. As Bokulich notes, this is too general as it stands, and fails to distinguish genuine explanatory models from those that merely save the phenomena. So, she enhances Morrison's approach by appealing to Woodward's understanding of the dependence of the explanandum on the explanans in counterfactual terms, but leaving aside Woodward's interventionism ([2003] ), which would reduce the account to a causal one (Bokulich [2008] , p. 226). As she notes, the exhibition of the structural elements means that there is a sense in which the elements of the model can be said to 'reproduce' the relevant features of the explanandum, and satisfaction of Woodward's counterfactual condition means the model should also be able to give information about how the target system would behave, if the structures represented in the model were changed in various ways. In addition, there is a justificatory step in which the domain of applicability of the model is specified and assurance is given that the explanandum falls within that domain. It is via such a justification that genuine explanations are distinguished from those that merely save the phenomena. Bokulich then goes on to argue that the relevant periodic classical orbits genuinely explain the phenomenon of wave-function scarring both because the relevant pattern of counterfactual dependence is exhibited and because top-down justification is supplied by Gutzwiller's periodic orbit theory. Furthermore, it is not the case that the classical trajectories cause the scarring; rather, as she emphasizes, what we have here is a case of structural explanation, in which the explanandum is explained by showing how the (typically mathematical) structure of the theory itself limits what sorts of objects, properties, states, or behaviours are admissible within the framework of that theory, and then showing that the explanandum is in fact a consequence of that structure (Bokulich [2008] , p. 229). Now, first of all, there seems to be nothing here that conflicts with either the partial structures approach in general or the inferential conception in particular. Certainly, one could appeal to the former to characterize the relevant models and in particular to capture the way in which such semi-classical models capture only certain features of what is ultimately a quantum mechanical phenomenon. However, it might be thought that Bokulich's framework does conflict with our criticism of Batterman, by virtue of the fact that, as the above quote reveals, she allows mathematical structures to limit the relevant behaviour of the system in question, yielding the phenomenon in question as a consequence. Here, we suggest, one must step carefully. If it were to be asserted that a mathematical structure, qua a piece of mathematics, sets such limits, our concern would arise again: in what sense can mathematics limit the behaviour of physical systems (beyond the obvious point that such systems cannot behave in logically impossible ways)? And likewise, we would want to know in what way a physical phenomenon could arise as a consequence of a piece of mathematics. But we do not think that is what Bokulich intends. As an example of structural explanation, she gives Hughes' explanation of the invariance of the speed of light as a consequence of the structure of Special Relativity and the underlying space-time ([2008] , p. 229). Thus, it is not purely mathematical structure that serves as explanans, but rather physical structure that, of course, is characterized or described mathematically. 15 And this is certainly the case when it comes to the explanation of wave-function scarring, with the caveat that the physical structure in this case is strictly fictional, since the classical orbits do not actually exist (but would be physical had they existed). Of course, the fictional nature of the model needs to be explored further, since one might have the concern that if it were entirely fictional in all respects, it could not perform any explanatory work. In the case of the classical models that Bokulich considers, it is the relationship between the classical elements that represents features of the quantum phenomena, and it is this relationship that is captured by Morrison's structural dependencies. More could be said about the explanatory role of fictional models in general, but our point is two-fold: firstly, Bokulich gives a clear explanatory schema in terms of Morrison's and Woodward's accounts, and secondly, we do not have in this case an unequivocal example of something akin to mathematics performing an explanatory role.
Certainly, then, structural explanations such as those exemplified by the cases above do not straightforwardly support Batterman's argument. In the case of both the explanation of the halting of white dwarf collapse and that of wave-function scarring, something over and above merely citing the relevant mathematics is required.
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In particular, even if the relevant mathematical feature that is introduced as part of the putative explanans is ineliminable (as in the case of the renormalization group but unlike that of the delta function), it still may be non-explanatory. So, for example, the axiom of choice-at least in one of its formulations-is ineliminable from the proof that every set is well ordered, but such a proof does not constitute an explanation, given that we cannot exhibit the well ordering in question. Here, we are just dealing with mathematical proofs and explanations, of course. In the cases Batterman presents, we have the additional concern as to how it could be that an ineliminable piece of mathematics can thereby account for how some particular physical phenomenon comes about. Again, one might appeal to the corresponding causal factors or structural features. Presumably, neither of these is what Batterman has in mind, but then it remains unclear in what sense the mathematics is explaining anything.
Explanation and Eliminability
If derivation is taken to yield explanation, then the derivation mentioned above of the fixed points counts as an explanation. But it is clearly implausible 16 One of the central issues in recent discussions concerns the claim that despite the acausal nature of mathematics, it is still explanatorily indispensable. Both here and in (Bueno and Colyvan [2011] ), it is not assumed that explanations need to be causal. Nevertheless, we maintain that some physical interpretation must be given to the mathematics; otherwise, it is simply radically indeterminate what the mathematics states about the physical world (with the possible exception of cardinality considerations).
to take mere derivation as sufficient for explanation, as the example just mentioned of the axiom of choice makes clear. Batterman himself appears to hold that derivation from ineliminable mathematics is sufficient, and presents the case studies in a naturalistic manner as evidence that scientists themselves are deploying a form of explanation not covered by standard philosophical accounts. 17 However, he does not provide an account of what such an explanation consists in. Instead, he points out the deficiencies of extant accounts with regard to the case studies he has presented. In his 2002 book, Batterman's central claim was that such case studies reveal fundamental theories in science to be explanatorily inadequate ([2002] ), since in order to understand the phenomena involved, concepts must be imported from less fundamental theories (as in Bokulich's case of wave-function scarring described above). Batterman explicitly considers the standard deductive-nomological (D-N) and causal-mechanical accounts of explanation and insists that these cannot accommodate the role of asymptotic reasoning he has presented, since the description of the relevant behaviour is not to be obtained on the basis of 'from-first-principle' solutions to the relevant equations, but are 'deeply encoded' in them and revealed only via asymptotic analysis. The suggestion that derivation from ineliminable mathematics is sufficient for explanation can be challenged in two ways. First, we can challenge that the mathematics Batterman discusses is indeed ineliminable. Second, even if we grant the ineliminable character of the relevant mathematics, we can still contest that derivation from such mathematics is sufficient for explanation. We consider each of these responses in turn.
With regard to the first response, care must be taken not to simply follow the physicists in taking certain mathematical structures as making an ineliminable contribution to our understanding of the relevant phenomena, when consideration of the mathematics may show that these structures in fact make only a heuristic and eliminable contribution. Indeed, one could follow 17 Thus, it may be that Batterman and we have different senses of explanation in mind here.
However, no matter the strength of one's naturalistic inclinations, some caution must be exercised in taking scientists' own reflections on their practice at face value. Of course, some of these reflections may be more philosophically informed than others. It may be that they attach the word 'explanation' to the kinds of moves at issue here (as indeed they do), but this may be no more than a convenient label signifying the kind of deductive relationship we have concerns about. Indeed, they may switch almost in the same breath from describing such moves as 'techniques' or even 'tricks' and referring to them as explanatory. Hence the importance of being clear about the sense of explanation that is in question. (We are grateful to Juha Saatsi for pressing us on this issue.) However, we are not suggesting that one should adopt a blanket scepticism with regard to such claims, nor are we suggesting that the naturalistic project of attempting to construct a theory of explanation that tracks scientists' own understanding is ill founded. Essentially all we are saying here is that until and unless it is made clear how (uninterpreted) mathematical structures can interact with or be appropriately related to physical systems, one should exercise caution about such claims. (We are grateful, again, to a referee for encouraging us to be clear on this issue.) Belot ([2005] ) in imagining a 'great intuitive analyst' who is asked to construct the asymptotic approximate solutions of a given partial linear differential equation, and who in effect 'decodes' these solutions. Various results could be obtained but, Belot maintains, at this point the analyst has only a mathematical understanding of the problem and in order to transform this into an explanation with physical content, a physical interpretation needs to be given which, crucially, will be in terms of the more fundamental theory. At best the less fundamental structures act as what Belot calls 'mathematical crutches' that enable us to make the relevant inferences that can be accommodated within a form of the D-N account. By taking their explanatory role seriously, it is alleged, Batterman is effectively guilty of reifying the mathematics. (Consider also Redhead [2004] who argues that the asymptotic analysis of universality should be understood as taking place within surplus mathematical structure.) Batterman has responded by insisting that, contrary to Belot's assertion, in the example considered with the great intuitive analyst, concepts from the less fundamental theory must be appealed to in order to provide at least part of the physical interpretation. The issue at stake here, however, is not about fundamentality, but about explanation. In what sense, exactly, is the invocation of ineliminable mathematics explanatory?
Even if we grant that the relevant mathematics is ineliminable, as we noted, this does not guarantee that it is thereby explanatory. A basic requirement here is that we understand how the explanans leads, in some sense, to the results in question obtaining, not simply that they do in fact obtain.
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This is the central issue. It is not enough, as we have said, to appeal to straightforward deduction of the relevant results in explicating this 'leading to'. Alternatively such understanding may be provided through the identification of suitable physical interpretations of the relevant mathematical results, as we noted in the cases of white dwarf collapse and wave-function scarring above. Identifying such suitable physical interpretation is clearly a major component of the inferential conception.
Of course, this is precisely what Batterman rejects, and it might be thought that we are in danger of begging the question here, given that he is arguing for a new form of explanation. However, given the problem of accounting for the role of mathematics in the obtaining of physical phenomena, even from a platonist standpoint, the onus is on Batterman to fill out the details of this new form of explanation and account for the purported explanatory power of the asymptotic reasoning that he highlights. One option would be to adopt Bokulich's extension of Morrison's notion of structural explanation, but, as we have indicated, this does not support an explanatory role for mathematics and can be accommodated within our account.
It is not enough for Batterman to eliminate extant accounts of explanation and yet insist that the relevant mathematical features are still explanatory, for they may well be merely an instance of useful surplus structure. Something further is required to render that surplus structure explanatory. And although in the case of the spin-blocking technique touched on above, some of the physicists involved in developing and applying this technique do state that it helps provide understanding of the phenomenon of universality, the sense in which the relevant reasoning can be understood as explanatorily forceful remains unclear. Of course, one can add explanatory force to the surplus structure by interpreting it in realist terms. But given the highly idealized nature of the technique, realist interpretations of the latter will not be straightforward. 19 This highly idealized nature is, of course, recognized in the literature, and in this context, the method is simply described as a 'technique'. This suggests to us that it is appropriately located within the R 3 -components of the partial structures approach.
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Requirements for Explanation
The core of our disagreement with Batterman then becomes clear. For us, the technique involves significant surplus structure. For Batterman, the claim that it provides understanding and explanation means that the structure cannot be surplus. This further exemplifies the need for Batterman to explicate the sense of explanation he is appealing to. Note that we are not demanding that Batterman accepts that one should appeal to a particular physical interpretation of the relevant elements of the mathematics in order to provide such an explanation, since that is precisely what he denies. Nevertheless, such an appeal does at least provide the relevant explication that is missing in his account. Without such an explication, it is not clear how Batterman can articulate the difference between a mathematical description and a mathematical explanation. Consider the example of a stone thrown into the air. At one point in time, the mathematical equation that describes the stone's movement has value zero. Does the fact that the equation has such a value provide an explanation of why the stone is at rest, or does it simply offer a mathematical description of the phenomenon in question? Presumably, no one would consider the fact that an equation has value zero to be by itself an explanation of a physical phenomenon. A suitable physical interpretation, which identifies the relevant physical processes responsible for the production of the phenomena in question, is needed in order to yield a satisfactory explanation. Unless Batterman can give a relevant account of explanation, he is unable to answer these questions appropriately.
Batterman may complain that in the examples he considers something different is going on, and we do have mathematical explanations without any corresponding physical interpretation. However, in precisely these cases, it is not clear whether all that we have are very elaborate mathematical structures that only describe the relevant phenomena. Batterman suggests that fundamentally different behaviour in the mathematical limit can be explanatory of physical regularities where that limit is not reached. Without an explication of what counts as explanatory here, it is not clear whether the behaviour being referred to is the result of nothing more than giving too much epistemic weight to these mathematical structures.
It would seem that the only grounds for even considering them to be explanatory in the first place are the statements of the physicists who may be investing these structures with greater epistemic significance than is warranted. As part of the practice of physics, nothing is really changed by referring to some structures as being explanatory or being just descriptive. However, a philosophical account of the practice has to be more careful. The distinction between explanation and description is significant, and it cannot be blurred just because physicists play fast and loose with the terminology.
In particular, it needs to be shown that Batterman's examples meet some basic requirements that all explanations satisfy before it becomes clear that we are dealing with a truly new sort of explanation (note that all of the conditions below are in fact met by extant accounts of explanation): 21 (a) Explanations are typically tied to understanding. Exactly what kind of understanding is involved in the production of the phenomena Batterman considers? How is that understanding different from a mere description of the phenomena in question?
In the case of the renormalization group, Batterman insists that:
the explanation for the universality of critical phenomena requires singularities; in particular, the divergence of the correlation length. Without this, we have no understanding of how physically diverse systems can realize the same behavior at their respective critical points. ([2010], p. 18) Thus, the mathematics is regarded as essential for our understanding of the phenomenon described by the explanandum. However, it remains unclear what this understanding consists in or how it differs from mere mathematical description.
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(b) Explanations have a certain structure, which varies according to different views, ranging from arguments to answers to why questions. Exactly what is the structure of the explanations involved in the asymptotic phenomena Batterman discusses? Presumably, the structure is such that the explanations are different from the mathematical descriptions of the phenomena that physicists articulate; otherwise, once again the distinction between explanation and description is lost.
An obvious option for Batterman at this point would be to say that explanations involving asymptotic reasoning are ultimately answers to a why question, such as: Why do physically diverse systems realize the same behaviour at their respective critical points? However, if the explanations Batterman has in mind have indeed the structure of why questions, then they are not the sort of radically new, unaccounted for types of explanation they are advertised as being.
Perhaps a better option for Batterman would be to say that the structure of explanations based on asymptotic reasoning is this: The issue to be explained is the stability of the diverse physical systems rather than a particular empirical regularity. And in order to explain that stability we need to 21 If Batterman's asymptotic reasoning proposal does not meet the conditions below, it is really unclear in what sense it qualifies as a form of explanation at all. 22 There has been, of course, some discussion of the role of understanding in explanation. But the details are not relevant for our argument here (see De Regt et al. (eds.) [2009] Batterman will presumably reply that we should grant such significance to the divergence of the correlation length, for example, precisely because it provides a unificatory account of 'how physically diverse systems can realize the same behavior at their respective critical points' ([2010] , p. 18). However, contrast this with the significance given to the height of the flagpole in the explanation of the length of its shadow: advocates of causal views of explanation argue that it is precisely the causal role that allows us to grant this significance and without it we lose the crucial asymmetry. We are not, of course, saying that Batterman must adopt such a view, but he must at least indicate how such significance can be conferred upon the divergent correlation length if he is also to maintain the appropriate explanatory asymmetry.
(d) Explanations typically involve the distinction between explanandum and explanans. However, in the cases considered by Batterman, it is unclear how to draw that line. Of course, the asymptotic limit and the description of the stability to be explained can be distinguished mathematically. But then so can all kinds of pairs of mathematical elements to which we would not ascribe the terms 'explanans' and 'explanandum'. Batterman owes us an account of the distinction in this particular case.
Thus, what we are offering here is a challenge to the account of explanation via asymptotic reasoning. If this account is truly explanatory, it needs to be shown how it meets at least these four criteria. We think that appropriate explanation of the halting of white dwarf collapse and wave-function scarring can satisfy these criteria, and we likewise suggest that the role of renormalization with regard to the universality of critical phenomena can be accommodated within a broadly structural account of explanation (although some of the details will be developed in future work). In the end, Batterman's rejection of the inferential conception is ungrounded, and his examples can be accommodated by this account and the partial structures approach in general, as we already indicated in the case of the rainbow and as we shall further discuss below.
Interpretation and Idealization
It is with regard to the role of interpretation that the inferential conception goes beyond a mere mapping account. In focussing only on the mappings, Batterman is correct in noting that: one might ask why simply having a partial mapping between some aspects of the physical situation and an appropriate mathematical structure accounts for the explanatory role that idealizations can play in applied contexts. So far what we have is a framework in which we can get some kind of partial representation of the full actual structure. [. . .] Prima facie, it seems we have no reason to believe that simply having an appropriate (partial) mapping is explanatory. Indeed, what is the argument that such a partial representation itself plays an explanatory role? ([2010] , p. 14)
He goes on to glean an answer from Bueno and Colyvan's discussion of economic theory that emphasizes the ranking of idealizations (Bueno and Colyvan [2011] ). Thus, he suggests, the less idealized the account, the more explanatory it is. However, as we've already said, the demand for less idealized accounts forms no part of our framework, nor does any imposed ranking, and furthermore this does not strike us as a reasonable account of either idealization or explanation. As we noted above, what we require is an account of why the results in question obtain, and this in turn will be provided by the relevant suitable interpretation, where that suitability is contextually dependent. In the case mentioned below-of the explanation of the behaviour of liquid helium in terms of the symmetry of the relevant wave-function-that interpretation will be articulated in terms of the relevant symmetry conditions or invariance principles. Of course, different theories of explanation will capture the relevant context dependence in different ways, and our account does not preclude the adoption of any of these theories. regarding the asymptotic behaviour, but then crucially a physical interpretation needs to be provided so these results can acquire physical import.
What is more interesting than the details of the physical interpretation is Batterman's insistence that he is not reifying the relevant mathematics, but that in the cases of interest this mathematics, and in particular infinite idealizations, must be appealed to in our explanatory practices. Again, he is not concerned with indispensability type arguments but with the putative role of mathematical operations in explanation. Here, and later in his response, he seems to agree with Redhead's point about the surplus mathematics, but insists that the role of this surplus is explanatorily ineliminable. However, as we already noted, ineliminability and explanatory capacity are very different things.
Explanation, Empirical Regularities and the Inferential Conception
Returning to the renormalization group example, we recall Batterman's claim that the nature of the phenomena he deals with is such that they cannot fit into extant accounts of explanation. In particular, he maintains that most accounts of explanation in science (even causal, non-covering accounts) assume that explanation involves subsumption of the explanandum under some regularity and hence cannot handle those cases where, by virtue of singularities such as indicated here, there are no such regularities and no laws governing the world. Again, he emphasizes that it is by examining such cases that we come to explain the very regularities that hold elsewhere, and this explanation 'will involve a demonstration of the stability of the phenomenon or pattern under changes in various details ' ([2010] , p. 21). However, this is not clear. One can, after all, explain low-level empirical regularities and not just their instances from higher level laws. Furthermore, there is nothing in our framework that states that the relevant relations must be law-like (although they may be, of course). So as it stands, there is nothing in Batterman's insistence above that precludes an account based on the mappings we have in mind from accommodating his examples. We have already indicated that this is the case in the example of the rainbow, and it is worth highlighting how the crucial moves can be applied in the context of other examples as well. However, let us be clear: the inferential conception does not offer an account of explanation per se, but rather it provides a framework in terms of which particular kinds of explanations can be articulated. We certainly agree that the phenomena that Batterman has emphasized stand in need of explanation. Where we disagree is with the claim that (a) the inferential conception cannot accommodate such phenomena, and (b) the relevant mathematics itself plays an explanatory role.
First, there is something curious about taking surplus mathematical structure to be ineliminable in scientific explanations. Consider an alternative example: that of the application of group theory to quantum mechanics. There the application crucially involved surplus structure and in particular what Weyl called 'bridges' between different parts of the mathematicsbetween the representations of the symmetry and unitary groups, for example (French [1999] ; Bueno and French [unpublished] ). But when it comes to the use of group theory as a framework for quantum statistics, and the explanation of, say, the behaviour of liquid helium involving Bose-Einstein statistics (Bueno et al. [2002] ), we don't take the symmetrization or anti-symmetrization of the relevant wave functions as merely pure mathematics playing an ineliminable explanatory role. Rather, we take Permutation Invariance to represent a fundamental feature of physical reality having to do with symmetry, if we are realists, or as supporting a possible physical interpretation if we are not. Here, it is the relevant symmetry, however construed, that is doing the explaining, not the mathematics by which it is represented. Likewise, even if the move to the Hamiltonian space and the invocation of the renormalization group in the above sketch is not eliminable in the way that Batterman ([2002] ) indicates for the case of wave and geometrical optics, one can argue that the actual explanatory work will be done by the physical interpretation, as we emphasized above. Here the interpretation will be of the renormalization group and the way the latter represents the scale invariance associated with certain systems. In this case, again, a form of structural explanation can accommodate this example in which this scale invariance is understood in terms of certain features of the physical structure of the world. 24 Second, the above sketch of spin blocking can be straightforwardly accommodated by the inferential account underpinned by partial structures: the phenomena to be represented concern the stability of certain properties of diverse systems. This is characterized mathematically, and abstract systems are employed to focus on and reveal the relevant property. This, in turn, is represented via appropriate Hamiltonians in Hamiltonian space. The relevant relations or mappings between the physical system and the mathematics, and between the mathematics, conceived of as surplus structure, can then be represented in terms of partial homomorphisms. With the application of the renormalization transformations one can make certain derivations-a crucial feature of our framework, of course-and one completes the process by re-interpreting the results obtained (concerning the fixed points) in terms of the relevant physical properties.
Similarly, the case of asymptotic reasoning in optics that Batterman ([2002] ) has identified can also be accommodated via the iterated inferential conception plus partial structures. The phenomena in question are modelled via the introduction of an immersion step into a new model in which the mathematical asymptotic phenomena can be exhibited and derived. In turn, these results are interpreted back into the original model and they in turn are interpreted in a physically relevant manner. 25 Let us also again recall the rainbow example (Batterman [2002] ). Here, neither wave nor ray theories of optics are capable of providing an appropriate explanation on their own. Instead, Batterman argues, features of both must be appealed to in order to construct an asymptotic 'borderland', which is effectively a model incorporating such features and through which an explanation can be provided via an embedding into the structure of catastrophe theory, for example, as we indicated above. Partial structures are precisely capable of capturing this kind of piecemeal construction, whereby certain elements of the wave and ray theories are partially immersed, via partial morphisms, into an asymptotic model from which the derivation of the relevant results is obtained, and which in turn are interpreted in terms of the physical set up. Asymptotic reasoning and partial structures need not be in conflict after all. Following Batterman ([2010] , p. 14), it might be objected that the mere existence of a partial mapping between a mathematical structure and an empirical set up is not enough to guarantee an explanatory role for the mathematics. On the inferential conception the objection goes, these mappings are seen to be explanatory because they suggest that the mathematical theory approximates a more complex structure that would be an exact analogue to the physical structure. However, if there can be partial mappings to mathematical structures that cannot be physically interpreted, then the ability of the inferential account to come up with such mappings would not account for the explanatory role of the mathematics used. 26 However, what we have shown above is that we don't need to come up with a direct physical interpretation of the relevant mathematical structures to accommodate Batterman's examples, since the relevant structures act as surplus structure related to those structures that are physically interpreted. As noted above, we don't think that mathematical structures on their own have such an explanatory role. Nevertheless, their role in the kinds of piecemeal constructions indicated above can be captured within our account using partial structures (and surplus structures when needed). 25 We would like to thank Bob Batterman for raising the issue of whether the partial structures framework can accommodate these features at the Bristol Conference on Geometrical and Mathematical Explanation in December 2009. 26 Our thanks go to an anonymous referee for raising the issue in this form.
Conclusion
We agree with Batterman that his examples shed new light on the practice of science and are significant for our understanding of crucial aspects of scientific reasoning. By bringing together the inferential conception and the partial structures framework, we are in a position to account for the nature and significance of the phenomena involved, as well as to offer an understanding of them within a unitary account of scientific practice.
